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Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between occupation and different types of human
capital—skills, education, ability and health. Summary statistics of our panel data from the
Ghana Household Worker Survey strongly suggest that height and health vary by occupa-
tion. Our regression results show that after controlling for age, gender and movement out
of jobs, the self-employed are the most likely to have at least one day of illness (a health
shock) in the past year. However, conditional on having at least one day of illness, the
self-employed have the lowest expected number of days ill. On the other hand, evidence
that large firm workers have longer illnesses than other workers, perhaps reflecting their
better employment circumstances that allow more time off when sick, cautions against the
use of days of illness as a measure of health that is unbiased by occupational choice. We
also investigate labour market outcomes and find that the number of days ill does not affect
the labour supply decision. Controlling for entry into the labour force, however, days of
illness does have a significant negative impact on earnings, especially if it exceeds 30 days.
Our analysis suggests that changes in health and changes in occupation are strongly cor-
related; understanding the causal links in this relationship should be the focus of future work.
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1 Introduction
The large increases in urban self-employment and rising numbers of microenterprises in Africa
raise an interesting issue: while the number of opportunities for employment may be increas-
ing, it is not clear how job quality in this type of employment compares with that of large
sector firms. The limited literature on the expansion of self-employment disagrees on this is-
sue. Looking at movements into and out of self-employment in Mexico, Fajnzylber, Maloney,
and Rojas (2006) conclude that self-employment is just as desirable as other labour market
alternatives. In contrast, Sandefur, Serneels, and Teal (2006) use labour market data for the
urban sector in Ghana, Tanzania and Ethiopia to show that incomes for the self-employed and
those in small firms are substantially less than those in large firms and the public sector (see
also So¨derbam, Teal, and Wambugu (2005)). Thus earnings differentials imply that the quality
of self-employment and jobs in microenterprises might be substantially inferior compared to
employment in large firms.
Yet these findings ignore the effects of health on occupational choice and earnings and the reverse
effects of occupation and income on health. Indeed, there is evidence in the literature that health
shocks result in a loss in income due to reductions in labor supply and/or productivity (Gertler
& Gruber, 2002), and that healthier individuals earn more. In other words, our analysis will be
incomplete if we ignore health.
We therefore explore the relationships between employment status, health outcomes and wages
in Africa. We are particularly interested in the self-employed and use two waves from new
panel data from the Ghana Household Worker Survey to investigate job quality and health
for these individuals. The key to understanding the nature of this relationship is observing
the individual at different points in time, so as to observe movements between jobs, changes
in income and shocks to health. Our panel data set, which is collected at the individual level
and contains detailed health and income information, is ideally suited to consider this problem.
We also incorporate data on skills and health knowledge, to see how the various aspects of
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human capital (health, education, skills and ability) come into play. The temporal aspect of the
panel gives us the opportunity to investigate whether the movement out of certain jobs impacts
health. Whether or not these movements are caused by or are the cause of health shocks is
an equally interesting element of health outcomes and has obvious implications for assessing
job quality. Dynamic extensions of this kind, as well as exploring the role of lagged health on
present health, are particularly insightful.
In this paper we use data from an urban sample in Ghana to look directly at the effect of past
illness and current job choice on current income, as well as the impact of past income and past
job status on current health. We begin by using the data to ask if job type varies along a
range of measures of health outcomes that can be observed in the data. As measuring health is
a difficult undertaking, we consider two measures for which we have consistent measurements
across the survey years: height and inactive days due to illness or injury.
In our in-depth analysis, we are aware that identifying the effects we are interested in is difficult
and confounded by simultaneity and endogeneity issues. First, while health as an outcome
is a major dimension of job quality, there is a concern that health may affect employment
status by determining participation in the labour force (see Currie and Madrian (1999) for a
review). In addition, it is also plausible for health to influence preferences for job type, so that
unhealthy individuals favour jobs in which lower productivity is required. This may be more of
a factor among the poorest individuals. Indeed, nutrition-based efficiency wage models imply
that the sickest individuals will be left out of the formal sector. Theory and empirical evidence
both suggest that nutrition, through its impact on overall health, strength, and endurance, is
an important determinant of worker productivity (Strauss, 1986; Deolalikar, 1988; Thomas &
Strauss, 1997). There are also potential feedback effects because productivity increases income,
which in turn can be reinvested in health by buying more inputs or higher-quality inputs (Strauss
& Thomas, 1998).
We attempt to establish causality and address these issues of simultaneity by combining the
individual data with data at the household level. More importantly, observing past changes
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in health and income allows us to control for past unobservables and avoid the problem of
simultaneous feedback effects. We show that past health shocks decrease current income, and
that skills matter both for health and income. The evidence shows that the self-employed may
be worse off in terms of health outcomes, as they have a higher likelihood of falling ill. Job
movements, especially those out of self-employment and large firms, do play a role in the health
story, although the direction of causality is as of yet unclear. Conversely, income has a complex
relationship with health, in that people who earn more are more likely to report an illness, but
also experience shorter illnesses conditional on having any days ill. This supports the idea that
those with better jobs and higher incomes can afford to be ill.
This paper proceeds in five sections. Section 2 offers a brief review of the literature. Section 3
sets out our theoretical framework and empirical strategy, and Section 4 offers relevant details
about the data. Results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes with ideas for
further research.
2 Empirical Evidence
Dealing with the complicated interdependent relationships between health, wages, and labour
supply is a challenge (see Strauss and Thomas (1998) for a very comprehensive review). In
general, the consensus is that better health raises labour participation and wages, and that
health shocks lower income and consumption.
2.1 Developed countries
Labour economists who look at health issues have been most interested in the effects of health on
wages. Research on data from developed countries is more common that research on developing
countries. Due to the rarity of panel data, most have focused primarily on the causal pathways
between current health and current income and the endogeneity problems that arise with this
approach (Lee, 1982; Ettner, 1996). Relatively little research has been able to exploit inter-
temporal changes in health and income, although a limited number of studies have contributed
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to this area.
Haveman, Wolfe, Kreider, and Stone (1994) use a 3-equation structural model and panel data
on American white men. The three equations describe health, hours worked (labour supply),
and wages. Health here is measured on a zero to three scale indicating the degree to which a
medical condition limits one’s ability to work. The authors conclude that prior (lagged) poor
health lowers wages and work time.
In an approach similar to our own, Smith (2003) investigates the impact on past health changes
and changes in socio-economic indicators, like income, on today’s health. He also looks at the
impact of health changes (shocks) on current income and labour supply. Unfortunately, he is
only about to look at household income, rather than individual income, but finds that health
shocks have a sharp negative effect on income, operating mainly through labour supply and not
through medical expenses.
2.2 Developing Countries
Much of the work on developing countries focuses either on the simultaneous relationship be-
tween health and earnings (Thomas & Strauss, 1997; Schultz, 2003; Schultz & Tansel, 1997;
Savedoff & Schultz, 2000), or the effect of health shocks on consumption (Wagstaff, 2006; Dercon
& Hoddinott, 2003; Pitt & Rosenzweig, 1986). The existing literature that uses panel data to
examine health shocks and income shocks has been somewhat limited. In addition, as income is
most often measured at the household level, determining the true effects of health on individual
income has been difficult. We believe that our ability to measure income at the individual level
will give us a much better picture of the true effect of a health shock on labour outcomes.
Gertler and Gruber (2002) use a panel data set from Indonesia, which allows them to look at
the effect of major health shocks on changes (first differences) in labour supply, income and
medical expenses, and the resulting ability of households to smooth consumption. Their health
measure is the individual’s ability to perform activities of daily living (ADLs). Their results
show that larger health shocks result in larger income losses, but they do not model a recursive
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health equation in addition their labour outcomes equation.
Lindelow and Wagstaff (2005) use a similar first differences approach with Chinese data and
find that illness results in large declines in labour supply and income. However, the income
data was measured only at the household level and then calculated on a per capita basis.
3 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical model developed by Grossman (1972) views health as an endogenously deter-
mined capital stock. Grossman’s premise is that health capital differs from other forms of human
capital because the stock of health “determines the total amount of time [one] can spend pro-
ducing money earnings and commodities” (Grossman, 1972, p. 224). The model predicts that
health should be positively correlated with wages, for better health will increase productivity
and thus wages, and higher wages will increase the demand for health and medical care.
Let us think, as Grossman does, of health outcomes as a function of several inputs. An adult
individual produces health H, which is determined by various factors:
Ht = H(Ht−1, It−1, wt−1, Bt, D(t,h), U, e(t,h)) (1)
where It−1 is a vector of health inputs, wt−1 is prior wage (in logs), B is a vector of family
background characteristics, and D(t,h) is a vector of community level variables affecting health.
The underlying time-invariant “healthiness” of the individual, U , is unobservable but known by
the individual, while e(t,h) is the component that is both unknown and unobservable to all, e.g.
measurement error.
Meanwhile, there exists a relationship that relates the log of real wages w in period t to several
inputs (Mincer, 1974):
wt = w(wt−1,Ht−1, Et, Bt, D(t,w), A, e(t,w)) (2)
where Et is education and Dt,w are community level infrastructure variables. Unobservable
time-invariant qualities known to the individual like ability are included in A; e(t,w) captures
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measurement error and random fluctuations in wt.
3.1 Empirical Model
From the framework above, we develop two approaches. First, we look at health and income in
a setting without a lag of the dependent variable, for which the model to be estimated can be
thought of as:
Hi,t = α0 + α1Xi,t + α2Ji,t−1 + ui,1t (3)
wi,t = β0 + β1Hi,t−1 + β2Xi,t + β3Ji,t + ui,2t (4)
where Xt is a vector of time-varying and time-invariant individual characteristics, and Jt and
Jt−1 are vectors of job characteristics. We measure Ht as the inactive days in the past year
caused by illness or injury.
We extend this model to incorporate dynamics of the dependent variable, creating structural
equations that relate health and income in the following way:
Hi,t = α0 + α1Hi,t−1 + α2wi,t−1 + α3Xi,t + α4Ji,t−1 + ηi + ui,1t (5)
wi,t = β0 + β1Hi,t−1 + β2wi,t−1 + β3Xi,t + β4Ji,t + ηi + ui,2t (6)
Because we are dealing with panel data, this kind of model brings up some serious endogeneity
issues, as Hi,t−1 and wi,t−1 will be correlated with the individual effects ηi. We are able to
deal with this for the wage equation, by instrumenting wi,t−1 with wi,t−2, available from the
2004 wave of the survey. However, we have not yet found a suitable instrument for Hi,t−1;
nevertheless, by comparing the static and dynamic results, it is strong evidence that the bias
resulting from this source of endogeneity in the health equation may not be a big concern.
We also use a selection equation to account for labour participation, as the wage in Equations 4
and 6 is only observed if one enters the labour force. This stage is identified with three variables:
number of children, a dummy for being married or not, and a dummy indicating one’s status
as the household head.
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Our identification strategy is dependent on the ability of height to capture one’s history of health
and nutrition inputs, so that we can successfully use height as a control for long-term health
that may or may not impact the short-term measure of inactive days.1 The main advantage of
this specification is that it allows us to see the effect of a prior health shock on today’s income,
while controlling for other confounding factors, and without worrying about the endogeneity
introduced by the contemporaneous feedback of current income onto current health.2
4 Data
The data are from the 2005 and 2006 waves of the Ghana Household Worker Survey (GHWS)
conducted by the Centre for African Studies (CSAE). The survey is a representative sample
of adult workers in urban areas in Ghana (Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi, and Cape Coast). The
number of individuals in this 2005-2006 panel is 1,073, from which 200 were dropped from our
sample due to missing values, because they were students, or because they were younger than
15 or older than 60, leaving us with 873 individuals. Table 4 presents simple summary statistics
for this sample.
Great care has been taken in the design of the GHWS to measure incomes for workers in both
the formal and non-formal sectors. In particular, the information collected on the self-employed
is very detailed and, in contrast to many other surveys, allows for much more accuracy when
determining earnings. This unique aspect of the GHWS means that we have individual level
earnings information for employees in all types of employment.
4.1 Skills
The 2006 wave of the GHWS includes data from four skills tests and a health knowledge test.
The skills tests include a Raven’s test, an English test, a mathematics test, and a reading test.
1There is some evidence in very recent literature regarding the endogeneity of height with respect to earnings
(Schultz, 2002); however, we assume here that height is predetermined, as is common practice.
2The endogeneity of the education variable in the earnings equation, due to omitted variables like ability and
school quality, has been well discussed in the labour economics literature. We do not instrument for education
in this paper, as it is not the focus of the analysis; however, previous work on the same data has concluded that
instrumenting education does not alter its effects on earnings (Sandefur et al., 2006).
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Both the mathematics and reading tests have two sections (elementary and more advanced),
which are weighted accordingly in the scoring. The health knowledge test is comprehensive,
covering such topics as sources, signs and home treatments for common ailments like diarrhea
and heat stroke, as well as a few specific items like polio, malaria, and nutrition.
Although these tests allow for admittedly crude assessments of one’s true skills, they are
much more informative than simple subjective questions regarding literacy and numeracy. The
Raven’s test is interesting in itself, as it tries to ascertain one’s natural intelligence, irrespec-
tive of schooling. Having access to such rich data about dimensions of human capital is rare,
rendering our results unique and new.
Looking at some summary statistics on skills in Table 1, there are clearly strong differences
in worker characteristics across occupations. This suggests that there is a strong selection
mechanism of highly skilled workers into good jobs, although some of this is undoubtedly driven
by age and gender. In addition, we cannot rule out the reverse possibility that some of these
skills are acquired or improved in some occupational settings and not in others. What is most
impressive in this table, however, is that those who do not earn any income are actually “more
skilled” than the average person in the sample in almost everything except health knowledge. In
fact, they are more skilled on average than those in the work force as well. This finding supports
the claim that high-skilled workers who are unemployed do not enter self-employment during
their unemployment spell but prefer to keep searching for a good formal sector job.
4.2 The Health Variables
The health measures that we will focus on are height and the number of days in the past
year that one has been unable to do one’s normal activity. These variables both suffer from
measurement error. For height, however, only 1.6% of the measurements seemed to be obviously
mis-measured and were treated as missing, and we were able to use data from the 2004 wave
of the panel to fill in some missing height values. Furthermore, in the sample that we use for
the results in this paper, characteristics such as gender, age and years of education do not have
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predictive power over whether a height measurement is grossly mis-measured or whether it is
missing. Therefore, we do not expect the measurement error in the height variable to cause
significant endogeneity issues.
In the case of days of illness reported, measurement error is probably present, as is the possibility
that more educated and wealthier people may be more likely to report illness (Schultz & Tansel,
1997), and labour supply decisions may be endogenous to this variable as people try to justify
leaving employment due to health reasons. Another potential problem with our days of illness
variable is that the 2005 survey and 2006 survey were not identical in the way in which these
questions were asked. In 2005, respondents were asked for the number of days ill in the past
three months, whereas in 2006, respondents’ frame of reference was a year. Therefore, to match
the 2006 year-long framework, the 2005 days ill variable has been adjusted.3 In addition, the
2006 survey asked for the number episodes of illness experienced during the past year (up to
a maximum of three episodes), and the corresponding number of days ill suffered during each
episode. From this information, we construct an aggregated number of days ill across these
three episodes. Information about days ill is unavailable for any additional episodes, although
only about 1% of the sample reports having more than three episodes, so we do not think this
has resulted in a downward bias in the days ill measure.
Some summary statistics regarding occupation and health status are helpful. For the whole
sample, 32% reported at least one day of illness in the last year. Table 2 breaks down days
of illness in the past year by wave of the survey, gender, and occupation. It is not altogether
clear yet from this table what the relationship between occupation and illness is. Women tend
to suffer more disabled days than men. Workers in small firms report less illness than others,
perhaps because their job stability is relatively precarious. The unemployed and self-employed
3It is possible to simply multiply the 2005 measure by four. This makes the strong assumption that health
over the past three months is representative of health over the past year. Instead, we took information about
health over the last year provided in 2005, in which a person noted his/her frequency of illness, which determined
the factor by which the 2005 days of illness measure was multiplied. For example, someone with 20 days of illness
in the last three months, but who also reported being ill “almost all of the time” was then deemed to have 80
days of illness in the past year. In any case, this adjustment, as compared with simply multiplying all of the 2005
measurements by four, did not change the results or our conclusions in any significant way. It simply allowed for
a smoother empirical distribution and hopefully better estimation.
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tend to have more days of illness than the average working individual.
It is also quite interesting to look at the distribution of height by occupation, shown in Figure
1. This graph shows clearly the stark differences in mean across occupations, with employees
of large firms and those in the public sector being much taller than others.
5 Results
5.1 Effects for Health
To examine the health-occupation relationship, we first consider the simple model without the
complications caused by including a lagged measure of health. Focusing, for the moment, on
days of illness as the dependent variable: we have several possible empirical strategies to deal
with this type of variable since it is has a high proportion of zeros, a very long tail, and is a
count. We chose to focus on a probit model, in which the dependent variable takes the value of
one if an individual reported one or more days of illness, but we also offer OLS estimates and
a count regression conditional on at least one day of illness.4
Estimates from the probit model are found in Table 6 (Table 3 offers variable definitions). There
are several things to note from this table, although we can start with the basics. Males are less
likely to suffer illness, but this effect is not significant. Age on its own has a positive impact on
the probability of having an illness, and its relationship is convex, so age has increasing marginal
effects. Surprisingly, education has nothing to do with illness here. Height is also insignificant,
suggesting that these short-term illnesses observed in this limited time-frame are pure shocks
and have little to do with underlying “healthiness”.
In addition, the NHIS variable, a community-level measurement of the proportion of people
reporting that they have registered to receive one of the new National Health Insurance Scheme
(NHIS) cards, is worth noting. It is significant, and controlling for all other variables at their
means, a one percent increase in one’s community’s take-up rate decreases one’s probability of
4We also estimated a tobit model, which confirmed the results reported here. Those results are available upon
request.
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falling ill by just under one percent.
In columns 1 to 3, we see that previous occupational choice does not seem to have a significant
impact on becoming sick, except for those in big firms, who have a higher likelihood of falling
ill. (The reference group here are those who earned no income last year.) This is most likely
a result of the fact that workers in big firms ‘can afford to be ill.’ Moreover, the relationship
between lagged occupation and the actual number of days ill is rather large, as can be seen in
the OLS estimates in Table 7 and in the NegBin results in Table 8. These two tables coincide
with what the summary statistics suggested, that those who are unemployed in the past year
experience many more days of illness on average than others.
Finding that large firm workers may have more days of illness is consistent with the fact that
employment circumstances for workers in big firms tend to be much better. On the other
hand, it does suggest that days of illness may not be the best measure of health with which to
investigate occupational effects. While we are trying to assess job quality, it may be job quality
itself which is driving some of the variation in days of illness; in the future, we will need to look
at more health measures in order to know how strong this phenomenon is.
After controlling for movement out of employment types, we are able to identify a much stronger
effect of self-employment (refer to columns 4-7, Table 6). Now, the self-employed have the
highest probability of falling ill, relative to all other categories. However, those who get out of
self-employment do just as well as the others; the null hypothesis of whether the coefficients
on “self-empl. last year” and “left self-empl.” sum to zero is accepted, so we have isolated
a positive relationship between self-employment and the probability of getting sick. whereas
leaving a large firm is associated with a big rise. We cannot be sure of the direction of causality
here—people may leave jobs because of health reasons, or health may alter job choice decisions—
so interpretation is difficult. Nonetheless, it is a very interesting finding that the pattern of job
choice is key to understanding how occupation and health interact.
The skills results are a little more difficult to interpret. Columns 5 and 6 show the addition of
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the skills variables. Innate ability, indicated by the Raven score, is linked to a higher probability
of illness: scoring ten percent higher on the Raven’s test raises the probability by roughly five
percent; the result for reading ability is similar. In contrast, English skills have a downward
effect on the probability of illness.
We also show the results for including health knowledge and then instrumenting it with parental
education and number of children in columns 6 and 7, respectively.5 It is obvious from these
results that health knowledge is indeed highly endogenous to health, i.e. the more unhealthy
one is, the more knowledge one acquires. Once instrumented, health knowledge and probability
of illness are negatively related, which makes more sense intuitively—presumably the more one
knows about health, the more one can prevent illness.
Moving on from the binary restriction imposed by the probit, we turn briefly to a zero-truncated
negative binomial model of days ill (Table 8). The dependent variable is number of days ill,
for individuals with at least one day. The estimation precision may suffer from the low number
of observations, but the regression is nonetheless an interesting addition to the information
provided by the probit. Being male reduces the expected count by 34%. Those without earned
income in the last year have much more days of illness than the self-employed and those in
small firms. In fact, the self-employed have the lowest number of days of illness. This could
be because they are actually healthier and thus have more minor illnesses. But combining this
with our evidence from the probit, the results support the alternative argument that the self-
employed’s work circumstances are inferior to those of market sector workers: not only do the
get sick with the highest probability, but they then stay sick for the shortest amount of time,
presumably because they have to return to work.
Employment in a big firm is associated with a more than doubling of inactive days, which is
again some evidence that those whose job security is less tenuous may enjoy more time for
convalescence. Similar to the probit model, job movement seems to be important, although
5We use a control function approach here, regressing health knowledge on the exogenous regressors; the results
of this first stage can be found in Table 5.
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more so for those moving out of large firms and those moving into the labour force or out of
self-employment.
The skills estimates are all significant. For those who are sick, it seems that intelligence and
numeracy help you to get well, whereas English knowledge and literacy are linked to longer
spells of illness. It is unclear at this point what exactly this means.
5.2 Effects for Earnings
Let us now look at the selection equation for earned income (Table 9), the first stage of our
earnings analysis. The variables that identify this selection are number of children, a dummy
for married, and a dummy for household head.
Gender is not a significant determinant of earning an income. That men and women have similar
employment rates may be a bit surprising, but this is probably because women are more likely
to be self-employed, and our binary earned income variable does not pick up on this nuance.
Some may also question why the Raven score variable is negative, and the rest of the skills and
education are insignificant. One would expect those who do not earn income to be on average,
less educated and less able. The answer may have something to do with signalling and worker
quality. It is likely that high quality workers stay out of the labour force, waiting for a good
job to come along, and do not seek self-employment in the interim because they fear it would
send a negative signal to potential (good) employers. Therefore, many of those without income
may in fact be more qualified than not.
As for the health factors, neither height nor the health shock (days ill last year) are important.
Although a past illness enters negatively, therefore decreasing the probability of having earned
income, it is statistically insignificant.6
Now, we can turn to the earnings equations in Table 10. The table shows the results of regressing
the log of monthly wages on several explanatory variables. Columns 1 through 4 are estimates
6A possible extension, that is beyond the scope of this paper, is to investigate further the fact that height
does clearly have something to do with occupation through a multinomial logit selection equation.
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without controlling for selection, and Columns 5-8 include an inverse Mills ratio (‘heckman’)
from the probit for earned income (the full model from Column 4, Table 9). The first column
offers a standard specification, in which hours, gender, age, education, and occupation all affect
earnings significantly. Here, it is clear that men earn more than women, and that age, which
may also pick up experience, raises earnings but at a decreasing rate. Employees in small firms
earn significantly less than the self-employed, and they both earn much less than others in large
firms and the public sector. When skills are added, the overall picture remains the same. And
although the skills variables take away some of the education effect, they certainly do not wipe
it out, which means that the skills are picking up characteristics that are not measured with
years of schooling.
A previous illness, or health shock, has a negative impact on wages, but height does not play
any role. This suggests that short-term shocks may affect income but long-term health does
not. Moreover, if health is controlling for the unobservables associated with health, then this is
a very strong result indeed. It must be acknowledged that outliers have a strong effect, and this
effect loses its statistical significance if we take out those people who experienced more than 14
days of illness last year. Even so, it is clear that for some people, who have serious illnesses,
these do have a downward impact on earnings.
After controlling for selection, the health shock is still significant (column 7), but we lose our
ability to identify this effect precisely when we put the whole model together by adding in
skills (column 8). Ability, measured by the Raven’s score, enters strongly here and increases
earnings.
5.3 Dynamic Effects for Health
Let us now consider a dynamic setting, in which lagged health is included as a determinant of
current health, and lagged earnings is included in the earnings equation. This autoregressive
model brings up new econometric issues, which have yet to be fully addressed by the authors.
However, we include them here because they are an integral part of understanding the inter-
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temporal nature of the health-income relationship.
The estimates for the dynamic probit model are presented in Table 11. It is easy to verify that
the point estimates, compared with Table 6, are nearly identical, which may be good evidence
that the lagged health variable does not introduce too much bias, although we cannot rule out
this possibility. As the results are so similar, we will limit our discussion here to the lagged
days ill variable, which is positive and significant. An 10-day increase in illness suffered in the
previous year translates into a 7% greater chance of falling ill this year.
Again, it is possible that this effect is being driven by outliers, and if we aggressively restrict
the sample to people without long illness spells, the effect’s statistical significance diminishes.
Using a dummy to indicate an illness in the previous year is also statistically insignificant for
the whole sample. If we instead use a dummy that indicates a long sickness (over 1 month) in
the previous year, the point estimates of the other variables are essentially unchanged, while
the dummy for a big health shock is statistically significant and shows that having a severe
illness last year increases the chances of falling ill this year by over 50%. This is important
evidence of the persistence of illness, especially for those who experience a somewhat severe
health shock.
5.3.1 Earnings or Occupation?
This occupational effect on illness that we have uncovered by including dummies for job move-
ment may have more to do with income variations across occupation than the occupation itself.
In order to investigate this question, we need to limit the sample size to those for whom we
have observed earned income. These results are presented in Table 12.
If we narrow our sample accordingly and control for the level of lagged income, it is true that
the lagged occupation effects lose their statistical significance in the probit model for having
any illness—income, for which the coefficient is significant, overrides the occupational differ-
ences. However, the dummy for leaving self-employment is still negative and weakly significant,
although we have trouble identifying it when the skills are added to the model. The effect of
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the income level is positive, so that higher income is associated with a higher probability of any
sickness. Again, this may be because those with higher incomes can afford to be ill. When we
run a count regression but control for the level of income, the coefficient on income is negative
but insignificant. Nevertheless, even if some of the occupational effect on health is working
through earnings, it does not take away from the fact that workers in different occupations
experience different health outcomes.
5.4 Dynamic Effects for Earnings
To examine the dynamic relationship in the earnings equation, we must limit the sample to
those people for whom we observe earned income in both 2005 and 2006. Estimates are offered
in Table 14 (refer to Table 13 for the relevant comparison of the same sample but without the
log of last year’s wage).
It is immediately clear that the previous year’s log wage dominates almost all of the other
explanatory variables. Earnings is clearly a persistent process, and last year’s earnings is a
strong, significant determinant of earnings today. Column 9-IV is an instrumental variables
model which instruments the lag of log wage with an individual’s log wage from 2004 to try to
purge some of the bias inherent to the dynamic linear panel model.7 This raises the estimate,
but does not change the conclusions. Interestingly, last year’s days of illness variable is still
significant, despite the power of lagged wages. This is a key result and implies that the effect
of a health shock is potentially very strong. Given our earned income probit findings, we
conclude that health shocks impact directly on earnings rather than indirectly through labour
participation.
6 Conclusion: Policy Implications
This paper attempts to assess the impact of various dimensions of human capital on earnings
as well as the relationships between some of these dimensions and health. Skills and ability
7For some individuals in the sample this was a predicted value from the regression of 2004 log wage on the
2004 levels of age, education, gender, occupation, and job tenure.
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definitely play a role in short-term health, but they are not as important for earnings. Education
is not a significant player, nor is health knowledge. Looking closer at the education-health
relationship is a potential improvement on our present analysis. In particular, determining
whether health operates indirectly through education is an interesting question but is beyond
the scope of this paper.
We also investigate the possibility of a virtuous or vicious cycle by which good (poor) health
leads to improved (lower) incomes which leads to improved (poorer) health. We present evidence
that occupational status, job movements and health are linked. Health shocks do not affect the
choice between working and not working, and that illness, at least for some who experience
serious health shocks, is persistent over time. Health shocks do have a negative effect on
earnings, especially for those who have recently been severely ill.
Overall, the question of whether higher incomes in large firms translate into better health is
highly relevant for policy, as we decide whether promotion of microenterprises is truly a pro-poor
strategy along non-income dimensions of welfare. We find some evidence that self-employment
may cause bad health, but we do not reach the same conclusion for workers in small firms.
Furthermore, our results suggest that job movement and health are intimately related. This
relationship should be explored more in future research.
Further research into the destination as well as the source of occupational change would be
extremely helpful. Using our data, it would be possible to link occupational changes to changes
in income, from which we can get a better understanding of why people move jobs, assuming
that income jumps indicate a choice to move jobs, and income declines indicate being forced
out of a job. This is left as a subject for future work.
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Figure 1: Height by Occupation
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Table 3: Variable Definitions
Variable Description
Male =1 if male.
Age age in years.
Education years of education, not including vocational training.
Height height in meters.
NHIS community-level measure of the percent of individuals who have registered
for an NHIS card (from 0 to 1).
Empl. small firm =1 if employed in firm with ≤10 employees.
Empl. big firm =1 if employed in firm with more than 10 employees.
Empl. public =1 if employed in the public sector.
Raven score correct answers as a fraction of the total on the Raven’s test.
Math score correct answers as a fraction of the total on the mathematics test.
English score correct answers as a fraction of the total on the English test.
Reading score correct answers as a fraction of the total on the reading test.
Health knowledge correct answers as a fraction of the total on the health knowledge test.
ln(hours) natural log of hours of work per week.
Earned Income =1 if non-zero wages.
Children individual’s number of children.
Married =1 if married.
HH head =1 if head of household.
ln(wage) natural log of real monthly earnings in Ghanaian cedis for all wage earners
(both the self-employed and those in the market sector).
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Regression Sample
Male 0.43
(0.50)
Age (years) 33.85
(10.46)
Education (years) 8.08
(4.17)
Height (m) 1.66
(0.075)
Children 1.29
(1.69)
Married 0.45
(.50)
Self-employed 0.47
(0.50)
Employed in small firm 0.14
(0.35)
Employed in big firm 0.15
(0.35)
Employed in public sector 0.04
(0.20)
No earned income 0.20
(0.40)
N 873
Values reported are sample means; standard deviations are
in parentheses.
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Table 5: Health Knowledge Control Function
Dependent Variable: Health knowledge score (∈ [0, 1])
Mother’s education (years) .001
(.001)
Father’s education (years) .003
(.001)∗∗
Children .018
(.003)∗∗∗
Raven score -.083
(.031)∗∗∗
English score .082
(.017)∗∗∗
Math score .076
(.033)∗∗
Reading score .082
(.024)∗∗∗
Cape Coast -.058
(.027)∗∗
Accra -.064
(.019)∗∗∗
Kumasi -.037
(.019)∗∗
Const. .314
(.020)∗∗∗
Obs. 869
R2 .246
All standard errors are robust.
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